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ALARCÓN, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Eileen McNulty, Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of 
Revenue, appeals from the district court's declaration that 
 
 
section 9(c) and 9.1 of Pennsylvania's Commonwealth Act 8 of 1993 
("Act 8") is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and the 
order permanently enjoining its enforcement.  We must decide 
whether Act 8 imposes an unconstitutional burden on interstate 
commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.  We reverse 
because we conclude that since the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 
("1994 Crime Control Act"), makes the conduct of a business that 
sells an interest in another state's lottery a federal crime, Act 




 Pic-A-State PA., Inc. ("Pic-A-State"), a Pennsylvania 
corporation, characterizes itself as a "messenger business . . . 
[operated] as a service to Pennsylvania citizens . . . where 
orders are received from persons who wish to participate in 
legalized and authorized lotteries of other states."  Pic-A-State 
conducts its business in Pennsylvania through retail stores, at 
which customers place orders for lottery tickets from other 
states.  The retail stores transmit the orders to purchasing 
agents in other states.  The retail stores charge the customers  
one dollar for each lottery ticket purchased.  The purchaser does 
not receive a ticket for his money.  Instead, the purchaser 
receives a receipt showing the numbers he selected. 
 
 
 In response to Pic-A-State's business activities in 
Pennsylvania, that state's legislature enacted Commonwealth Act 8 
of 1993.  Section 9(c) of Act 8 provides: 
 Except as provided in this act, no 
person shall engage in the sale or offering 
for sale within this Commonwealth of any 
interest in a lottery of another state or 
government whether or not such interest is an 
actual lottery ticket, receipt, contingent 
promise to pay, order to purchase or other 
record of such interest. 
 
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 72, § 3761-9(c) (Supp. 1994).  Section 9(d) 
provides that "[a]ny person convicted of violating this section 
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof, 
shall be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding two thousand 
dollars ($2,000)."  Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 72, § 3761-9(d) (Supp. 
1994).  Section 9.1 of Act 8 directs "[t]he secretary [to] enter 
into a compact with any other states that permit sale of 
Pennsylvania lottery tickets within their borders to sell those 
states' lottery tickets within this Commonwealth."  Pa. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 72, § 3761-9.1 (Supp. 1994).  Act 8 was signed into law 
on May 20, 1993. 
 Anticipating that Act 8 would render its business illegal in 
Pennsylvania, Pic-A-State filed a complaint in the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania on June 1, 
1993, alleging, inter alia, that Act 8 violates the Commerce 
Clause.  Pic-A-State requested that the district court (1) issue 
a stay of the July 19, 1993 effective date of Act 8 pending 
resolution of this matter, (2) declare that Act 8 violates the 
 
 
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, and (3) issue 
an injunction prohibiting the enforcement of Act 8.  
 
 
 The district court consolidated the proceedings for a 
preliminary and permanent injunction pursuant to Rule 65(a)(2) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure1 and ordered that the matter 
be tried on July 9, 1993.  The parties filed briefs and the 
district court heard oral argument on July 9, 1993.  On July 15, 
1993 the district court issued a stay barring indictments or 
prosecutions under Act 8 pending the entry of its final order and 
judgment. 
 On July 23, 1993, the district court entered an order 
declaring sections 9(c) and 9.1 of Act 8 unconstitutional and 
permanently enjoining their enforcement.  The district court also 
filed a memorandum decision setting forth its rationale.  It 
concluded that Act 8 was unconstitutional under the Commerce 
Clause because it placed an impermissibly discriminatory burden 
on interstate commerce.  The court noted that because Act 8 
facially discriminates against interstate commerce, it was 
subject to heightened scrutiny pursuant to Norfolk Southern Corp. 
v. Oberly, 822 F.2d 388, 398 (3d Cir. 1987) ("[S]tate actions 
that purposefully . . . discriminate against interstate commerce 
. . . are given heightened scrutiny.").  The district court 
determined that the state's purpose in enacting Act 8 was to 
control fraud and theft in out-of-state lottery sales, and 
protect the interests of the state's senior citizens who benefit 
                     
    1 Rule 65(a)(2) provides, in pertinent part: "Before or after 
the commencement of the hearing of an application for a 
preliminary injunction, the court may order the trial of the 
action on the merits to be advanced and consolidated with the 
hearing of the application."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2). 
 
 
from the profits realized from the sale of Pennsylvania lottery 
tickets.  The district court concluded that Act 8 could not 
withstand heightened scrutiny because the state could enact less 
discriminatory regulation to accomplish its goals.  Secretary 
McNulty filed a timely appeal from the district court's order. 
 Prior to the date scheduled for the oral argument of this 
matter before this court, Congress enacted the 1994 Crime Control 
Act on August 25, 1994.  The 1994 Crime Control Act was signed 
into law on September 13, 1994.  One portion of the 1994 Crime 
Control Act makes it a federal crime knowingly to transmit in 
interstate commerce information for the purpose of procuring 
interests in an out-of-state lottery if one is "engaged in the 
business of procuring for a person in 1 State such a ticket, 
chance, share, or interest in a lottery . . . conducted by 
another State (unless that business is permitted under an 
agreement between the States in question or appropriate 
authorities of those States)."  Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 320905, 108 Stat. 
1796, 2126.  In resolving the issues raised in this appeal, we 
must assess the effect the 1994 Crime Control Act has upon the 
constitutionality of Act 8.  "Our standard of review is plenary."  
Juzwin v. Asbestos Corp., 900 F.2d 686, 689 (3d Cir.), cert. 




 As an initial matter, Pic-A-State argues that it would be 
manifestly unjust for this court to apply the 1994 Crime Control 
Act in assessing the constitutionality of Act 8.  Supp. Letter 
Memo. at 3-5.  In support of this argument, Pic-A-State relies 
upon a line of Supreme Court cases addressing the question 
whether a newly-enacted law should be retroactively applied to 
matters pending on appeal.  Pic-A-State's reliance on this 
principle of retroactivity law is misplaced because a 
determination by this court will not have a retroactive effect on 
Pic-A-State's past conduct. 
 "A statute does not operate 'retrospectively' merely because 
it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the 
statute's enactment or upsets expectations based in prior law."  
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1499 (1994) 
(citation omitted).  Rather, we "must ask whether the new 
provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed 
before its enactment."  Id.   
 In the matter before us, application of the 1994 Crime 
Control Act to the issue presented to this court attaches no new 
legal consequences to the activity engaged in by Pic-A-State 
prior to the enactment of the 1994 Crime Control Act.  In its 
complaint, Pic-A-State sought an injunction to bar the 
prospective enforcement of Act 8 following its July 19, 1993 
effective date.  As the Supreme Court has noted, "relief by 
injunction operates in futuro."  Id. at 1501 (internal quotation 
omitted).  "When the intervening statute authorizes or affects 
 
 
the propriety of prospective relief, application of the new 
provision is not retroactive."  Id.  Accordingly, we must 
consider the impact of the 1994 Crime Control Act on the 
constitutionality of Act 8.  
 
 III. 
 During oral argument before this court, Pic-A-State stated 
"it appears, upon our initial analysis, that the [1994 Crime 
Control Act] pre-empt[s] the field and . . . may be another way 
to affirm the district court."  We disagree. 
 The "ultimate touchstone" of pre-emption analysis is the 
congressional intent underlying a statute.  Cipollone v. Liggett 
Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2617 (1992) (internal quotation 
omitted).  As the Supreme Court explained, 
 Congress' intent may be explicitly 
stated in the statute's language or 
implicitly contained in its structure and 
purpose.  In the absence of an express 
congressional command, state law is 
pre-empted if that law actually conflicts 
with federal law, or if federal law so 
thoroughly occupies a legislative field as to 
make reasonable the inference that Congress 
left no room for the States to supplement it. 
 
Id. (citations and internal quotation omitted).  An examination 
of the 1994 Crime Control Act demonstrates that it does not 
pre-empt Act 8. 
 In amending 18 U.S.C. § 1301, Congress did not explicitly 
state that its intention was to pre-empt any state legislation.  
Moreover, Act 8 is not in conflict with the 1994 Crime Control 
Act.  As amended, section 1301 prohibits the business of 
 
 
procuring for persons in one state an interest in a lottery 
conducted in another state.  Act 8 also proscribes the sale 
within the state of Pennsylvania of an interest in another 
state's lottery.  The crime defined in Act 8 is totally 
consistent with the conduct prohibited by the 1994 Crime Control 
Act. 
 Contrary to Pic-A-State's contention, Congress has not 
indicated an intention to preclude all state legislation 
concerning the interstate sale of an interest in a lottery.  
Rather, the 1994 Crime Control Act expressly authorizes 
interstate compacts regarding the sale of interests in 
out-of-state lotteries.  Accordingly, we must reject 
Pic-A-State's contention that the 1994 Crime Control Act 
pre-empts Act 8. 
 
 IV. 
 The purpose of the Commerce Clause is to protect the 
national interest in facilitating commerce between the states and 
with foreign nations.  To implement this purpose, the Commerce 
Clause gives Congress the authority to define the national 
interest.  The Supreme Court has implemented this purpose with a 
number of Commerce Clause doctrines: 
 (a) Where Congress has acted in a particular area of 
interstate commerce, inconsistent state regulation is barred,  




 (b) Where Congress has acted to pre-empt state regulation of 
a particular area of interstate commerce, state regulation, 
consistent or inconsistent, is precluded,  Jones v. Rath Packing 
Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (inconsistent food labeling 
requirements)  Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502 (1956) 
(striking down a consistent state sedition law that would hamper 
federal enforcement at a time when the federal government had 
chosen to occupy the field); Southern Ry. Co. v. Reid, 222 U.S. 
424, 440 (1912) (ratemaking and regulation of interstate 
transportation of goods by rail service); 
 (c) Even where Congress has not acted, there are areas where 
the national interest in uniformity is so important that no state 
regulation is permitted, Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 119 
(1890) (importation of intoxicating liquors); Cooley v. Board of 
Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 315 (1851) (regulation of navigable 
waters); and 
 (d) Even where Congress has not acted to regulate a 
particular area of interstate commerce, states are precluded by 
the "dormant Commerce Clause" from enacting regulation that 
discriminates against interstate commerce or unduly burdens that 
commerce, Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151-52 (1986) (upholding 
state ban on importation of fish bait where necessary to protect 
the public health);  Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 954 
(1982) (finding reciprocity agreement in state ground water 
regulation unconstitutional because it imposes a burden on 
interstate commerce that outweighs any local interests served), 
unless such discrimination is expressly authorized by Congress, 
 
 
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 431 (1946) 
(holding that the McCarran Act expressly authorizes states to 
regulate and tax the business of insurance, even where such 
regulation and taxation might burden interstate commerce); 
Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 174 
(1985) (holding that federal law authorized states to decide 
whether to allow in-state banks to be purchased by out-of-state 
holding companies). 
 Where Congress has proscribed certain interstate commerce, 
Congress has determined that that commerce is not in the national 
interest.  Where such a determination has been made by Congress, 
it does not offend the purpose of the Commerce Clause for states 
to discriminate or burden that commerce.  As a result, in those 
instances where Commerce Clause challenges to state regulation 
have been mounted in an area where Congress has made it a crime 
to conduct such commerce, the courts have conducted only a 
two-fold inquiry, asking (1) whether federal law precludes all 
state legislation in that area, and (2) if state regulation is 
not precluded, whether the state statute conflicts with the 
federal provision.  California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 733 (1949); 
Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251, 255-56 (1908) (upholding state 
cattle inspection requirements which did not conflict with 
existing federal requirements).  In situations much like that 
before us, the Supreme Court has sustained the validity of state 




 In California v. Zook, the Supreme Court was faced with a 
Commerce Clause challenge to a California statute that made it a 
crime to sell or arrange transportation over the state's public 
highways with carriers that did not hold a permit from the 
Interstate Commerce Commission.  Zook, 336 U.S. at 726 & n.1.  
The federal Motor Carrier Act contained a similar prohibition 
with regard to carriers operating in interstate commerce.  Id. at 
726-27 & n.2.  After enunciating the principles of the dormant 
Commerce Clause applicable when Congress has failed to act, the 
Court stated: 
 There is no longer any question that 
Congress can redefine the areas of local and 
national predominance . . . .  When Congress 
enters the field by legislation, we try to 
discover to what extent it intended to 
exercise its power of redefinition . . . . 
 
 But whether Congress has or has not 
expressed itself, the fundamental inquiry, 
broadly stated, is the same: does the state 
action conflict with national policy?  The 
[rules applicable when Congress has not 
acted], the question of congressional 
"occupation of the field," and the search for 
conflict in the very terms of state and 
federal statutes are but three separate 
particularizations of this initial principle. 
 
Id. at 728-29 (citations omitted).  The Court then resoundingly 
rejected the rule urged upon it by the respondents, "that when 
Congress has made specified activity unlawful, . . . state laws 
'aiding' enforcement are invalid."  Id. at 729; see also Taylor 
v. State, 516 P.2d 1351, 1354 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973) (upholding 
state pandering law where its prohibition on procuring women for 
transportation for immoral purposes is consistent with the Mann 
 
 
Act's ban on the interstate transportation of women for such 
purposes).  The touchstone of the test is whether the state 
prohibition conflicts with the scope of the federal law.  This 
has been the general principle expressed for state legislation 
 
 
governing prostitution,2 monopolies,3 and lotteries.4  By amending 
18 U.S.C. § 1301, Congress prohibited the interstate sale of 
lottery interests.  Act 8 complements the federal statute by 
prohibiting the sale of lottery interests within the borders of 
                     
    2              In accordance with the well-settled 
principle that, in the event of conflict 
between federal legislation regulating 
interstate commerce and a state statute, the 
federal legislation prevails and the state 
legislation is of no effect insofar as it 
impinges upon the field of interstate 
commerce occupied by the federal enactment, 
state legislation relating to the 
transportation of females for purposes of 
immorality is valid only insofar as it does 
not conflict with federal legislation on the 
subject. 
 
63 Am. Jur. 2d Prostitution § 22, at 365 (1984) (footnotes 
omitted). 
    3 "[T]he fact that Congress has acted to prevent restraints 
on trade in interstate commerce does not necessarily invalidate 
state legislation effecting substantially the same result, and 
the fundamental inquiry in such instances is whether the state 
legislation is in conflict with the national policy."  15 C.J.S. 
Commerce § 133, at 869 (1967). 
    4              A gambling transaction involving an 
instrumentality of interstate commerce 
appears to be the subject of both federal and 
state regulation or prohibition, if there is 
no conflict between the state and federal 
legislation on the subject.  Lottery tickets 
are the subjects of commerce insofar as the 
carriage of such tickets from one state to 





38 Am. Jur. 3d Gambling § 11 (1968) (citing The Lottery Case 
(Campion v. Ames), 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (rejecting a Commerce 
Clause challenge to the federal lottery ban)). 
 
 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
Act 8 does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.  The judgment 
of the district court will be reversed. 
